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POLARIZING IMPACT: INDIGENOUS
CONSULTATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LABOR ORGANIZATION CONVENTION 169 AND
THE EMERGING POLAR SHIPPING INDUSTRY
Danika Elizabeth Watson*
Where I live, the sea ice never stops. It’s a living thing.
—Jayko Oweetaluktuk, Inukjuak, Nunavik1
The foundation, projection, and enjoyment of Arctic sovereignty and
sovereign rights all require healthy and sustainable communities in the
Arctic. In this sense, “sovereignty begins at home.”
—Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Arctic Sovereignty (2009)2
The whole situation is surreal because the long-time mariners like myself
are not effectively consulted when it comes to marine shipping lanes, or
even if there should be increased shipping . . . . The political jockeying for
the Arctic, the political jockeying for increasing the marine traffic through
a transarctic route—it makes me feel powerless . . . . This whole economic
drive, these economic incentives to do a faster route through the Arctic, in
my mind, is going to leave people like myself with less say about what goes
on up here because it will involve all of these countries throughout the
world because international maritime law doesn’t just involve the two
bordering countries, US and Russia, it involves every country of the world!
—Austin Ahmasuk (Iñupiaq), Nome, Alaska3

* J.D. Candidate, 2022, Fordham University School of Law; M.M., 2017, The Juilliard

School; B.M., 2015, Northwestern University. I live and work on Dena’ina ełnena, the
beautiful ancestral lands stewarded by the Dena’ina people and occupied as unceded territory.
Thanks to Professor James Brudney for his support in creating this paper and for all my
classmates in his seminar, Labor Law in the International Context. Thanks especially to Ed
McLaughlin, Becca Spendley, and the Fordham Law Review Volumes 90 and 91 boards for
their careful work.
1. INUIT CIRCUMPOLAR COUNCIL, THE SEA ICE NEVER STOPS: CIRCUMPOLAR INUIT
REFLECTIONS ON SEA ICE USE AND SHIPPING IN INUIT NUNAAT i (2014),
https://secureservercdn.net/45.40.145.201/hh3.0e7.myftpupload.com/wpcontent/uploads/Sea-Ice-Never-Stops-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/RJ4E-SKY7].
2. Id. at 24.
3. Id. at 37 (alterations in original).
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I. SEA CHANGE
The coastal Arctic in 2020 saw near-record warming, shrinking ice and
snow cover, the second-lowest sea ice extent on record, forest fires and heat
waves, and thawing permafrost as the region continued its shift from a frozen
climate toward one characterized by open water and rain.4 As the world
heads ever-faster toward an ice-free Arctic, circumpolar nations and other
powerful states are preparing to take advantage of the Far North’s growing
economic potential, including polar shipping routes which would
revolutionize nonrenewable resource extraction delivery and global trade
alike.5 Melting sea ice and less predictable weather also bring new
challenges to Indigenous people tied to the Arctic environment for millennia
practicing traditional lifeways and to the health of Indigenous people, the
health of their Arctic homeland, and the wellbeing of future generations.6
With one thousand miles of Arctic coastline in Alaska, the United States is
one of the world’s eight Arctic nations,7 but it lags far behind in its adoption
and ratification of international law governing the Arctic and its Indigenous
people.
This Article analyzes U.S. ratification of International Labour
Organization (ILO) Convention 169, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples
Convention (“Convention 169” or “C. 169”),8 by evaluating the impact in
terms of its ability to solidify its protections of the land and lifeways of Arctic
Indigenous people and strengthen the United States’s position as an
international leader in Arctic life, development, and policy. Part I presents
the issues. Part II introduces the growth of a polar shipping industry in the
context of a rapidly melting Arctic. Part III provides a brief gloss on the
complex and shifting international legal framework governing Arctic
sovereignty and the Arctic Indigenous people, and then outlines, in detail, the
consultation and participation norms of Articles 6 and 7 of Convention 169.
4. See Henry Fountain, Arctic Sea Ice Reaches a Low, Just Missing Record, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 21, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/21/climate/arctic-sea-ice-climatechange.html?searchResultPosition=15 [https://perma.cc/VV5L-62MB]; Henry Fountain, The
Arctic Is Shifting to a New Climate Because of Global Warming, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/14/climate/arctic-changingclimate.html?searchResultPosition=17 [https://perma.cc/SDZ7-XQNK]; Henry Fountain,
Shift to a Not-So-Frozen North Is Well Underway, Scientists Warn, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/08/climate/arctic-climatechange.html?searchResultPosition=3 [https://perma.cc/3E54-36SM]; Kate Ramsayer, 2020
Arctic Sea Ice Minimum at Second Lowest on Record, NASA (Sept. 21, 2020),
https://climate.nasa.gov/news/3023/2020-arctic-sea-ice-minimum-at-second-lowest-onrecord/ [https://perma.cc/NXS8-93B2].
5. See, e.g., Ed Struzik, As Arctic Melts, Inuit Face Tensions with Outside World,
YALE ENV’T 360 (Oct. 1, 2012), https://e360.yale.edu/features/as_arctic_melts_inuit_face_
tensions_with_outside_world [https://perma.cc/46MC-2AJ5].
6. See INUIT CIRCUMPOLAR COUNCIL, supra note 1, at ii, 4–6.
7. See generally Laura Neilson Bonikowsky, The Arctic, Country by Country, DIPLOMAT
& INT’L CAN. (Oct. 4, 2012), https://diplomatonline.com/mag/2012/10/the-arctic-country-bycountry/ [https://perma.cc/LAP2-VCVL].
8. See Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention ILO, 1989 (ILO No. 169),
https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C169
[https://perma.cc/UKV3-EJBU ] [hereinafter “C. 169”].
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Part IV evaluates Convention 169’s ability to protect and promote Arctic
Indigenous rights to self-determination and its potential application in an icefree Arctic shipping industry. Finally, Part V concludes that the United
States should ratify Convention 169 and implement consultation under
Articles 6 and 7 as an imperfect, yet worthwhile, modality for promoting the
interests of Indigenous people in the rapidly growing polar shipping industry.
II. POLAR MELT: CHANGE IN ARCTIC LANDS AND WATERS
This part briefly introduces the relevant background regarding climate
change affecting the Arctic, the emerging Arctic shipping industry, and the
Indigenous peoples and governments directly affected.
a. Climate Change and the Arctic Ocean
The once-icebound Arctic region is warming at nearly three times the rate
of the rest of the world, largely the result of increased emissions of
greenhouse gases from burning fossil fuels like coal, oil, and natural gas.9
These changes present serious challenges to traditional lifeways of coastal
Indigenous communities.10 Changes underway in the Arctic have wideranging consequences for world commerce; a recent economic analysis of
global costs of Arctic climate change over the ninety-year period between
2010 and 2100 estimated the cumulative cost as between $7 trillion and $90
trillion.11
b. Arctic Shipping: An Emerging Polar Industry
As the polar ice cap melts and Far North routes open in the onceimpassable oceans, the large-scale polar marine shipping industry will
emerge.12 Climate models project that late-summer sea ice extent in the
9. See Andrew Freedman, Global Warming Has Profoundly Transformed Arctic in Just
15 Years, Report Warns, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (Dec. 8, 2020),
https://www.adn.com/nation-world/2020/12/08/global-warming-has-profoundlytransformed-arctic-in-just-15-years-report-warns/ [https://perma.cc/T2B4-B3C6].
10. See Natan Obed, President, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, Remarks at the Meeting of First
Ministers and First Nations, Inuit and Metis Leaders (Mar. 5, 2016),
https://www.itk.ca/remarks-by-natan-obed-at-the-meeting-of-first-ministers-and-firstnations-inuit-and-metis-leaders [https://perma.cc/78EV-WR4U] (“Unprecedented rates of
summer sea ice loss, reduced sea ice in winter, ocean acidification, temperature and sea level
rise, melting permafrost, extreme weather events and severe coastal erosion undermine our
ability to thrive in our environment.”); see also JACQUELINE RICHTER-MENGE ET AL., ARCTIC
REPORT CARD 2020: A 15-YEAR RETROSPECTIVE, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. 9–
10 (2020), https://arctic.noaa.gov/Portals/7/ArcticReportCard/Documents/ArcticReportCard_
full_report2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/J8J9-EUHT].
11. See ARCTIC MONITORING & ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME, SNOW, WATER, ICE AND
PERMAFROST IN THE ARCTIC:
SUMMARY FOR POLICY-MAKERS 13 (2017),
https://www.amap.no/documents/download/2888/inline [https://perma.cc/Q6YY-PJCB].
12. See James Astill, The Melting North, ECONOMIST (June 16, 2012),
https://www.economist.com/special-report/2012/06/16/the-melting-north
[https://perma.cc/7R6A-5NN5] (“[T]he great melt is going to make a lot of people rich . . . .
An obvious [geostrategic consequence] is the potentially disruptive effect of new trade routes.
Asia’s big exporters, China, Japan and South Korea, are already investing in ice-capable
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Arctic will continue to decrease rapidly, leading to a seasonally ice-free
Arctic Ocean later this century. These projections have fueled abundant
discussion about possibly new and geographically-shorter international
shipping routes linking the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans by the Northern Sea
Route or Northwest Passage. Where these passages used to be clear of sea
ice and become passable only occasionally and for a short time during the
summer, projections indicate that these passages may no longer remain
frozen by as early as 2035.13 Many countries are already establishing
significant footholds through expanded territory claims far out into the
coastal shelf and investing in icebreakers, port facilities, navigation and
charting, and other infrastructure measures necessary to develop the Arctic.14
vessels, or planning to do so. For Russia, which has big plans to develop the sea lane with
trans-shipment hubs and other infrastructure, this is a double boon. It will help it get Arctic
resources to market faster and also, as the NSR becomes increasingly viable, diversify its
hydrocarbon-addicted economy.”); Tim Ellis, Warming Opens Polar Shipping Route; “IceFree Arctic Ocean” by Summer 2035?, KUAC (Aug. 14, 2015, 11:15 AM),
https://fm.kuac.org/post/warming-opens-polar-shipping-route-ice-free-arctic-ocean-summer2035 [https://perma.cc/Q73A-VCDQ]; Satellite Observations of Arctic Change: Human
Activities, NAT’L SNOW & ICE DATA CTR., http://nsidc.org/soac/cascading-impacts
[https://perma.cc/NV29-SK2E] (last visited Apr. 14, 2022) (“Declining summer sea ice opens
the prospect of . . . increased marine traffic.”); Lawrence C. Smith & Scott R. Stephenson,
New Trans-Arctic Shipping Routes Navigable By Midcentury, PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S.
(Mar. 26, 2013), https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1214212110 [https://perma.cc/JJ72-SRZL]
(“Climate model projections indicate that [an] overall trend [of decreasing late-summer sea
ice extent in the Arctic] will continue, leading to a seasonally ice-free . . . Arctic Ocean later
this century.”).
13. See, e.g., Jennifer Hansler, Pompeo: Melting Sea Ice Presents “New Opportunities
for
Trade”,
CNN
(May
7,
2019,
4:44
AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/06/politics/pompeo-sea-ice-arctic-council/index.html
[https://perma.cc/N82W-9LJT]. U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo presented an Arctic
policy speech in Finland that emphasized security threats in the Arctic from Russia and China
and praised the Arctic region for its economic opportunities, noting that “[s]teady reductions
in sea ice are opening new passageways and new opportunities for trade . . . This could
potentially slash the time it takes to travel between Asia and the West by as much as 20
days . . . . Arctic sea lanes could become the 21st century Suez and Panama Canals.” Id.
Secretary Pompeo also stated that “America is the world’s leader in caring for the
environment.” Id. In response, the Arctic Institute’s President and Managing Director Dr.
Victoria Hermann stated: “America’s Arctic ambivalence is a far greater threat than the
ambitions of Russia and China combined. With no strong fleet of icebreakers, no Arctic
Ambassador, and no climate change policy, America is arguably the weakest circumpolar
nation, and shows no signs of correcting course . . . . At a time where the region is undergoing
abrupt and dangerous climate changes, . . . [t]he Trump Administration should be more
concerned about the imminent threat it is posing to Americans through climate inaction than
Chinese and Russian ambitions.” The Arctic Institute’s Reaction to Secretary of State Mike
Pompeo’s Speech in Rovaniemi Ahead of the AC Ministerial Meeting, ARCTIC INST. (May 6,
2019),
https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/reaction-secretary-state-mike-pompeos-speechrovaniemi-finland-arctic-council-ministerial-meeting/ [https://perma.cc/9FCG-ET5Q].
14. See Arctic Competition, Part One: Resource Competition in the Arctic, FOREIGN
POL’Y (Oct. 13, 2020), https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/10/13/arctic-competition-resourcesgovernance-critical-minerals-shipping-climate-change-power-map/ [https://perma.cc/8G8DCC3Y]; Scott Borgerson et al., The Emerging Arctic, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL.,
https://www.cfr.org/interactives/emerging-arctic#!/emerging-arctic [https://perma.cc/5PSU8VMU] (last visited Apr. 14, 2022); China to Develop Arctic Shipping Routes Opened by
Global Warming, BBC NEWS (Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china42833178 [https://perma.cc/47UL-UVFA]; Xie Wenwen & Caixin Globus, For Chinese
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The shipping industry presents a potential source of stable long-term and
seasonal employment for Arctic Indigenous peoples, for whom resourceextraction industries are among the primary employment opportunities as
their communities have undergone a 200-year shift from subsistence to cashand-trade and waged employment.15 Increased ship traffic may also present
further danger to local communities, including icebreakers disrupting sea ice
and causing early breakup and damage to Inuit transportation corridors and
subsistence patterns—as well as heightened pollution, oil spills,
contamination, and need for disaster response far beyond small Indigenous
communities’ capacities.16 Moreover, Arctic-dwelling Indigenous people
already have seen impacts on marine mammal behavior as vessel noise rises,
threatening the livelihood of whale hunters by injuring and driving whales
away from their hunting grounds, issues which will be exacerbated by
increased marine ship traffic.17
c. People and Nations Involved
Arctic industries—notably, resource-extraction activities including
exploration and the development of nonrenewable resources—
demonstrate varying relationships with local residents.18 In some cases,
local residents glean meaningful financial and employment benefits, but in
others, they bear the burden of responding to the direct and indirect social
and environmental impacts on northern residents.19 Since the 1970s and
1980s, various power-sharing strategies have been implemented in Arctic
resource governance. 20 These strategies include formal “co-management”
arrangements that share power between governments and resource users
to reduce conflicts over common resources.21
Co-management
arrangements can also work toward achieving sustainability by providing
Indigenous peoples with increased authority in resource decision-making,

Companies, Investment in Arctic Infrastructure Offers Both Opportunities and Challenges,
ARCTIC TODAY (June 17, 2019), https://www.arctictoday.com/for-chinese-companiesinvestment-in-arctic-infrastructure-offers-both-opportunities-and-challenges/
[https://perma.cc/G7W5-YCEL].
15. See John Downing, An Evaluation of the Impact of Shipping on Arctic Indigenous
Peoples, U. WASH. HENRY M. JACKSON SCH. INT’L STUD. (June 27, 2019),
https://jsis.washington.edu/news/an-evaluation-of-the-impact-of-shipping-on-arcticindigenous-peoples/ [https://perma.cc/K4B9-ZWMS].
16. See INUIT CIRCUMPOLAR COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 27–30.
17. See id. at 30.
18. See STEFANSSON ARCTIC INST. & ARCTIC COUNCIL SUSTAINABLE DEV. WORKING
GROUP, ARCTIC HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT (AHDR): REGIONAL PROCESSES AND GLOBAL
LINKAGES
255–59
(2014),
http://norden.divaportal.org/smash/get/diva2:788965/FULLTEXT03.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GR9V-RJQD]
(describing resource governance strategies and outcomes in the Arctic, focusing on the
nonrenewable resource extraction industries).
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., id. at 258–59.
21. Id.
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while improving governments’ compliance with regulations and
policies.22
i. Indigenous Peoples in the Arctic
Arctic Indigenous communities include the Sámi (Finland, Sweden,
Norway, and Northwest Russia), Nenets, Khanty, Evenk, and Chuckchi
(Russia), Aleut and Yupik (Alaska), and Inuit (Alaska, Canada, and
Greenland).23 These communities have a unique connection to Arctic
landscapes and seascapes, as marine people dependent on the Arctic Ocean
for transportation, its marine resources for food security, and free movement
on land, sea ice, and the Arctic ocean.24
Several of these communities have already begun the immense work of
advocating and regulating the emerging industry. For example, Inuit of
Alaska, Canada, Greenland, and Chukotka (Russia) came together and
established the 2018 Utqiaġvik Declaration during the Thirteenth General
Assembly of the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) which outlined specific,
sustainable development goals. These goals include directing the ICC “to
advocate for policies that facilitate cross-boundary Inuit trade, employment,
and travel, across our circumpolar homeland” and urging the ICC “to
promote sustainable economic and business development through the Arctic
Council and its working groups, the United Nations agencies, and collaborate
with other economic development fora and networks focusing on the Arctic,
including the Arctic Economic Council.”25 In November 2020, the ICC
participated in the International Maritime Organization (IMO) Marine
Environment Protection Committee virtual meetings, calling on its direct and
strong interest in IMO’s discussions on Arctic shipping.26 After the
meetings, the ICC released a statement calling for stronger protections for
safe Arctic shipping, after what it considered a “weak” regulation passed
during the meetings.27 The ICC has been working with the industry and
regulators to ensure safe Arctic shipping protocols and states that Arctic
marine traffic is “vital to the region’s economic base, resupplying

22. See id.
23. See Downing, supra note 15.
24. See Okalik Eegeesiak, The Arctic Ocean and the Sea Ice Is Our Nuna, U.N. CHRON.
(May 2017), https://www.un.org/en/chronicle/article/arctic-ocean-and-sea-ice-our-nuna
[https://perma.cc/6SVB-DX3K].
25. Utqiaġvik Declaration 2018 As Declared by the Inuit of Alaska, Canada, Greenland,
and Chukotka on the Occasion of the 13th General Assembly of the Inuit Circumpolar Council
(ICC) from 16–19 July 2018 in Utqiaġvik, Alaska, and in the context of the Assembly Theme:
Inuit—The Arctic We Want (July 19, 2018), https://www.arctictoday.com/wpcontent/uploads/2018/07/2018-Utigavik-Declaration.pdf [https://perma.cc/X3FA-WYX7].
26. See Press Release, Inuit Circumpolar Council, Inuit Call for Stronger Protections for
Safe Arctic Shipping Considering Weak HFO Ban Passed at IMO (Nov. 24, 2020),
https://www.inuitcircumpolar.com/news/inuit-call-for-stronger-protections-for-safe-arcticshipping-considering-weak-hfo-ban-passed-at-imo/ [https://perma.cc/JN7V-MXPW].
27. Id.
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communities and providing goods and services to remote locations.”28 Dr.
Dalee Sambo Dorough (Inuk), International Chair of the ICC, stated that
“protection of Arctic marine environment will accompany safe shipping
guidelines that protect Inuit food security, the crew members, as well as the
economic interests of those who are using the Arctic marine region.”29 In an
Arctic policy report to Canada’s Special Senate Committee on the Arctic, the
ICC has also urged that the governments must recognize the use and
occupation of the Northwest Passage as an important historical contribution
of the Inuit people.30 In addition, the ICC has requested that governments
must work closely and collaboratively with Inuit to establish a proactive and
diplomatic response to the emerging questions shipping raises for Arctic
sovereignty, including limits on foreign shipping, ship noise, heavy fuel oil
use, foreign owned- or operated-cruise ships and small vessels, and China’s
growing interest in commercial shipping.31
ii. Arctic States
The eight Arctic nations are Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway,
Sweden, Russia, and the United States.32 These nations comprise the Arctic
Council, the preeminent governmental forum for addressing issues related to
the Arctic Region, and which focuses on matters related to sustainable
development and environmental protection.33
Several nations have already begun engaging with Indigenous
communities in the polar shipping industry, but serious sovereignty problems
have begun to emerge. For example, Canada responded to major outcry over
its design for a network of “low impact shipping corridors” across the
Canadian Arctic, which would provide better access to infrastructure,
28. Id.; see also Kelly Eningowuk & Carole Simon, Inuit Circumpolar Council Calls for
Safe Arctic Shipping to Protect Inuit Rights and the Marine Environment—ICC Applies for
IMO Consultative Status, INUIT CIRCUMPOLAR COUNCIL (Feb. 25, 2020),
https://www.inuitcircumpolar.com/news/inuit-circumpolar-council-calls-for-safe-arcticshipping-to-protect-inuit-rights-and-the-marine-environment-icc-applies-for-imoconsultative-status/ [https://perma.cc/UP39-C3Q6] (“Modern day remote Arctic communities
depend on markets in the south for many of our goods. With this comes the need for safe and
economically sound shipping and transportation routes to move people and goods to and from
this region, which is becoming more accessible, as ice recedes. ICC’s position is clear, we
must take measures to ensure safe Arctic shipping in a manner which does not further burden
remote Inuit communities.”).
29. Id.
30. See SUBMISSION OF THE INUIT CIRCUMPOLAR COUNCIL CANADA TO THE SPECIAL
SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE ARCTIC REGARDING THE ARCTIC POLICY FRAMEWORK AND
INTERNATIONAL
PRIORITIES
4–6
(Mar.
2019),
https://sencanada.ca/content/sen/committee/421/ARCT/Briefs/InuitCircumpolarCouncilCana
da_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/TH66-VDZK].
31. Id.
32. See Arctic Region, OFF. OF OCEAN AND POLAR AFFS., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
https://www.state.gov/key-topics-office-of-ocean-and-polar-affairs/arctic/
[https://perma.cc/RVG3-JJGD] (last visited Apr. 14, 2022).
33. See id. The Arctic Council’s mandate specifically excludes military security and is an
international forum that “operates on the basis of consensus, echoing the peaceful and
cooperative nature of the Arctic Region.” Id.

172

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[Vol. 90

navigational support, and emergency response services, because they failed
to consult Indigenous voices in their design.34 In response, a team of
researchers from the University of Ottawa began Arctic Corridors Research,
a research team consulting First Nations’ voices, while building relationships
with partner Indigenous communities. Arctic Corridors Research aims to
build policy on shipping guidance in Arctic Canada which outlines shipping
trends, identifies culturally significant marine areas, and provides
recommendations for low-impact corridors.35 While the government has
mapped Arctic Corridors’ suggested changes to low-impact shipping routes
and shared with Canadian federal agencies, the Canadian government has not
yet implemented the plans and anticipates that the final outcomes will take
years to implement.36 The well-documented failures of Canada’s low-impact
shipping corridor design—not to mention the absence and inadequacies of
formal avenues for Indigenous voices in the design process—signal a clear
need for a well-structured and obligatory Indigenous consultation process as
the Arctic nations continue to develop the polar shipping industry.
III. CONSULTATION AND SELF-DETERMINATION: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
THE ARCTIC
This part provides the international law context of applying Convention
169 in the Arctic region.
a. International Law in the Arctic
The central demand for international law made by Indigenous peoples is
the claim to control and own their territories and their resources, as
Indigenous relationships with land is a key pillar of self-determination.37
Convention 169 represents one of two distinct legal approaches to developing
international human rights law to protect the rights of Indigenous peoples—
to elaborate on specific norms recognizing the rights of Indigenous peoples,
which is also taken in the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
34. See Sophie Yeo, Indigenous People Help Develop Better Arctic Shipping Routes, HILL
(Feb. 17, 2020), https://thehill.com/changing-america/sustainability/climate-change/482927indigenous-people-help-develop-better-arctic [https://perma.cc/4LB3-MZU7].
35. See generally Jack Dawson et al., Arctic corridors and northern voices project:
Methods for community-based participatory mapping for low impact shipping corridors in
Arctic
Canada,
7
METHODSX
1,
1–4
(2020),
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2215016120302843
[https://perma.cc/ZZ8U-9UND] (presenting the Arctic Corridors research details, design, and
methodological approach); Arctic Corridors: Research for Policy on Shipping Governance
in Arctic Canada, ARCTIC CORRIDORS RSCH., https://www.arcticcorridors.ca/reports/
[https://perma.cc/DWD6-PJZ8] (last visited May 16, 2022) (collecting representative Arctic
Corridors reports).
36. See Yeo, supra note 34.
37. See S.J. Rombouts, The Evolution of Indigenous Peoples’ Consultation Rights Under
the ILO and U.N. Regimes: A Comparative Assessment of Participation, Consultation, and
Consent Norms Incorporated in ILO Convention No. 169 and the U.N. Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples and Their Application by the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights in the Saramaka and Sarayaku Judgments, 53 STAN. J. INT’L L. 169, 173–75 (2017).
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Peoples (UNDRIP). The other approach is to recognize that the rights of
Indigenous peoples may be protected through the application of general
human rights norms, including the application of minorities’ provisions and
human rights treaty monitoring bodies associated with the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESR) and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the
property rights protections offered by regional human rights instruments.38
Both approaches increasingly address the rights of Arctic Indigenous
peoples. Although international law clearly presents a trend of consolidating
Indigenous rights, this trend has only limited penetration in the domestic
legal systems of the Arctic states, particularly in the three large federal Arctic
states of the United States, Canada, and Russia.39 The Nordic states are more
receptive to the influences and developments of international law.40 Norway
and Denmark are both parties to Convention 169, Denmark has enacted a
new self-governance act which recognizes the right to self-determination of
Inuit of Greenland, and all four Nordic states are parties to the two
international covenants.41
b. Convention 169
The ILO adopted Convention 169 on June 27, 1989 as a means of
developing and supporting new ways to enhance the protection of human
rights for aboriginal peoples.42 At least twenty-four countries have ratified

38. See STEFANSSON ARCTIC INST. & ARCTIC COUNCIL SUSTAINABLE DEV. WORKING
GROUP, supra note 18, at 234–35, 237–38.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See id. Norway implemented Convention 169 through the Finnmark Act, which
accorded an equal number of representatives from the Sámi Parliament and other residents of
95 percent of the northernmost county of Norway. Finnmark Act (Act No. 85 of June 17,
2005 relating to Legal Relations and Management of Land and Natural Resources in the
County
of
Finnmark),
https://lovdata.no/dokument/NLE/lov/2005-06-17-85
[https://perma.cc/SV7Q-X545]; see also STEFANSSON ARCTIC INST. & ARCTIC COUNCIL
SUSTAINABLE DEV. WORKING GROUP, supra note 18, at 240. However, the Finnmark Act has
been criticized for not implementing Convention 169 properly in marine and other Sámi
regions. See STEFANSSON ARCTIC INST. & ARCTIC COUNCIL SUSTAINABLE DEV. WORKING
GROUP, supra note 18, at 240–41.
42. See C. 169, supra note 8; UNDERSTANDING THE INDIGENOUS AND TRIBAL PEOPLES
CONVENTION, 1989 (NO. 169): HANDBOOK FOR ILO TRIPARTITE CONSTITUENTS, INT’L LABOUR
ORG.
1–5
(2013),
https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/--normes/documents/publication/wcms_205225.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D9CK-SWKM]
[hereinafter Understanding C. 169 Handbook]. The ILO has concerned itself with Indigenous
peoples since the early twentieth century and recognizes that labor conditions of Indigenous
peoples are consequences of deep-rooted injustice and intrinsically linked to issues of identity,
culture, language, customs, and land. See Understanding C. 169 Handbook, supra at 4. The
ILO Forced Labor Convention, Convention 29, was “directly inspired” by the discrimination
and exploitation of Indigenous and tribal workers. Id. Convention 169 is the ILO’s second
Convention targeted at the labor conditions of Indigenous and tribal peoples and was drafted
to be responsive to the problems raised by the inherently assimilationist 1957 Indigenous and
Tribal Peoples Convention (C. 107). See id.
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Convention 169, including Arctic nations Denmark and Norway.43
Convention 169 aims to overcome discriminatory practices affecting
Indigenous and tribal peoples, covering a wide range of issues including
employment and vocational training, education, health and social security,
customary law, traditional institutions, languages, religious beliefs, and
cross-border cooperation.44 Its preamble contextualizes Convention 169 in
light of “the developments which have taken place in international law since
1957, as well as developments in the situations of indigenous and tribal
peoples in all regions of the world.” The preamble also sets out aims,
including “recognising the aspirations of these peoples to exercise control
over their own institutions, ways of life and economic development and to
maintain and develop their identities, languages and religions, within the
framework of the States in which they live.”45 Convention 169 applies to all
Indigenous and tribal peoples, who constitute more than 370 million people
in seventy countries worldwide, as defined by a set of subjective and
objective criteria which capture both people’s self-identification as
“Indigenous” or “tribal,” as well as factors including descent from
populations who inhabited a region at the time of conquest, colonization, or
establishment of state boundaries.46 They constitute approximately 5 percent
of the world’s population, but 15 percent of the world’s poor.47
Convention 169 is the cornerstone of the ILO strategy for Indigenous
peoples’ rights for inclusive and sustainable development, which aims to
strengthen ILO action concerning Indigenous and tribal peoples, address
inequality and discrimination, and improve Indigenous livelihoods and
working conditions, while building capacity for effective application of
Convention 169.48 The ILO insists that Indigenous and tribal peoples do not
retain “special” rights under Convention 169, but rather it provides special
measures to respond to the particular challenges that Indigenous and tribal
peoples face to enjoying “the same human rights and fundamental freedoms
as all human beings.”49 Further, the ILO situates Convention 169’s broad
concern for Indigenous rights with several provisions beyond the traditional
scope of labor issues.50 It recognizes that Indigenous people’s generalized
43. Ratifications of C169—Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169),
INT’L
LABOUR
ORG.,
https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11300:0::NO::P11300_INSTRU
MENT_ID:312314 [https://perma.cc/PSD9-QBY5] (last visited Apr. 14, 2022). Ratifying
countries include Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominica, Ecuador, Fiji, Guatemala, Honduras, Luxembourg, Mexico,
Nepal, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Spain, and Venezuela. See id.
44. See Understanding C. 169 Handbook, supra note 42, at 1–3.
45. C. 169, supra note 8, at Preamble.
46. See Understanding C. 169 Handbook, supra note 42, at 2–3.
47. See id. at 2.
48. See INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ RIGHTS FOR INCLUSIVE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT,
INT’L
LABOUR
OFF.
POL’Y
DEV.
SESSION
1–5
(Oct.
7,
2015),
https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/--relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_412809.pdf [https://perma.cc/VR95-86MQ].
49. Understanding C. 169 Handbook, supra note 42, at 3.
50. See id. at 4–5.
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marginalization leaves them vulnerable to exploitative labor practices. 51 It
also recognizes that Indigenous people still suffer disproportionately from
the worst forms of labor exploitation, and that the combined effect of
undervalued traditional lifeways and limited access to education and
vocational training leaves them seriously disadvantaged in the international
labor market.52 A key principle of the ILO is that “poverty anywhere
constitutes a danger to prosperity everywhere,” and the ILO has concerned
itself with large, systemic problems involving the living and working
conditions of Indigenous peoples since its inception.53
Indigenous peoples were not formally involved in the drafting of the ILO
instrument.54
The ILO’s gesture towards including and providing
substantial, wide-reaching access to Indigenous people during the drafting
phase consisted of developing a questionnaire and initiating a special appeal
to governments to consult representative organizations of Indigenous and
tribal peoples.55
i. Article 6, Consultation
Consultation under Convention 169 is a fundamental right of Indigenous
peoples and a fundamental principle of inclusive development.56 Article 6(1)
stipulates a general requirement to consult Indigenous peoples whenever
legislative or administrative measures directly affect them.57 Consultation
takes place prior to decision-making, while participation (under the related
Article 7) is an ongoing dialogue that takes place throughout the decisionmaking process.58 Convention 169 also provides specific circumstances
which raise an additional obligation to consult, including exploration of
mineral and subsurface resources,59 alienation or transmission of Indigenous
peoples’ lands outside their own communities,60 vocational training
programs,61 and educational programs.62 The ILO Committee of Experts on
Application of Conventions and Recommendations’s (CEACR) 2011
General Observation clarified the standards for consultation under
Convention 169, which must: (1) be “formal, full and exercised in good
faith” in a “genuine dialogue between governments and indigenous and tribal
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. Id.; see also ILO Declaration of Philadelphia, INT’L LABOUR ORG. (MAY 10, 1944),
https://www.ilo.org/legacy/english/inwork/cb-policyguide/declarationofPhiladelphia1944.pdf [https://perma.cc/B83Z-X233] (asserting the ILO’s
core aims and purposes including that “poverty anywhere constitutes a danger to prosperity
everywhere”); Rombouts, supra note 37, at 178–79.
54. See Rombouts, supra note 37, at 181.
55. See id.
56. See Understanding C. 169 Handbook, supra note 42, at 11.
57. See C. 169, supra note 8, art. 6(1).
58. Id. arts. 6(1), 7.
59. See id. arts. 15–16.
60. See id. art. 17.
61. Id. art. 22.
62. Id.; see also id. art. 27.
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peoples characterized by communication and understanding, mutual respect,
good faith and the sincere wish to reach a common accord;” (2) put
“appropriate procedural mechanisms” in place at the national level and “in a
form appropriate to the circumstances;” (3) involve “indigenous and tribal
peoples’ representative institutions” where considering “legislative and
administrative measures;” and (4) “be undertaken with the objective of
reaching agreement or consent to the proposed measures.”63 Governments
are responsible for ensuring that Indigenous participants have all relevant
information provided in an intelligible form and manner, providing sufficient
time for Indigenous parties to engage in internal decision-making processes,
and making real effort to understand how the Indigenous parties’ decisionmaking processes function, such that they may adapt the form and timing of
consultation to the Indigenous parties.64
Further, the ILO sets out strict standards for what individuals or
organizations truly represent Indigenous peoples, stating that “[t]he
important criterion is that representativeness should be determined through a
process of the indigenous peoples themselves.”65
The Indigenous
representative must be able to clearly identify its constituents and its
accountability toward these constituents.66 If organizations are not truly
representative of the communities, the resulting consultations are not in
compliance with Convention 169.67 Finally, Article 6(1)(c) specifically
provides that governments are responsible for establishing means and
providing resources for developing Indigenous peoples’ own institutions and
initiatives for building ongoing dialogue.68
The ILO established the consultation process in order to safeguard the
rights of Indigenous people to participate in the general civic life and to
participate in the adoption of any measures which may affect them directly.69
The CEACR urges that, without meaningful Indigenous consultation and
participation in matters that directly affect Indigenous people, economic
development is unlikely to reflect the aspirations and needs of Indigenous
people and implicates serious repercussions for the success and
implementation of development programs.70
The ILO’s tripartite structure, built upon a principle of equal representation
of government, employer, and workers, provides no dedicated avenue for
representation of Indigenous people.71 This shortcoming has been criticized
by Indigenous peoples.72 However, the ILO maintains that “it has not been
63. Understanding C. 169 Handbook, supra note 42, at 13 (quoting the CEACR 2011
General Observation).
64. See id. at 15.
65. Id. at 14.
66. See id. The ILO also notes that courts and ILO supervisory bodies alike have seen
contests over failure to meet standards of representativeness. Id.
67. See id. at 15.
68. See id.; C. 169, supra note 8, art. 6(1)(c).
69. Understanding C. 169 Handbook, supra note 42, at 13.
70. See id.
71. See id. at 8.
72. See id. at 9.
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an obstacle in practice” to Indigenous access to the ILO’s supervisory
mechanisms, pointing to several cases of Indigenous people forming specific
workers’ and employers’ organizations, or chapters within broader
organizations.73 The ILO further notes that in some countries, workers’ and
employers’ organizations form alliances with Indigenous people to address
labor violations affecting Indigenous individuals or communities and to
support Indigenous economic development and enterprise growth.74 Finally,
the ILO points to the Program to Promote ILO Convention No. 169 (PRO
169)—its comprehensive technical assistance program that educates and
promotes application of Convention 169—that supports tripartite
constituents and Indigenous and tribal peoples in more than twenty-five
countries.75
Overall, the ILO presents a positive-minded position on the lack of a direct
access channel for Indigenous representation in applying and reporting on
Convention 169, touting the strength of the tripartite model for leading to
“greater cooperation among the social partners, ensur[ing] stronger
awareness and participation in matters relating to international labour
standards and eventually lead[ing] to better governance.”76
IV. CONSULTATION UNDER CONVENTION 169 IN ARCTIC SHIPPING
This part outlines the primary issues in consultation in practice and in the
potential application in the United States, including issues, proposed
resolutions, and remaining open questions.
a. Lessons and Issues in Consultation
The Committee of Experts’s (“the Committee”) commentary on
Convention 169, in particular Article 6, reveals several clear, common, and
interrelated issues in implementing consultation. These include:
• failure to consult Indigenous and tribal peoples in the development
of the consultation process,77
• failure to develop sufficient consultation procedures before
undertaking decision-making that directly affects the Indigenous and
tribal peoples, 78
• failure to implement those procedures appropriately such that they
create favorable conditions for achieving agreement or consent to the

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
See id. at 8.
See id. at 9.
Id. at 8.
See EXCERPTS FROM REPORTS AND COMMENTS OF THE ILO SUPERVISORY BODIES:
APPLYING THE INDIGENOUS AND TRIBAL PEOPLES CONVENTION, 1989 (NO. 169), INT’L LABOUR
ORG. 13–15 (2019), https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---protrav/--ilo_aids/documents/publication/wcms_714341.pdf [https://perma.cc/65CW-3H3D].
78. See id. at 15–17.
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proposed measures (though actually achieving agreement or consent
is not required), 79
• failure to establish a climate of mutual trust where Indigenous and
tribal peoples are historically marginalized and mistrust state
institutions, 80 and
• failure to establish genuine dialogue that goes beyond mere
informational meetings as required.81
Regarding consultation and participation on natural resources, the
Committee observed special difficulties in establishing a solutions-oriented
dialogue where economic and development industry interests differ from the
cultural, social, and economic interests of the Indigenous people of the
region.82
The next subsection illustrates how the Sámi consultation process in
Norway demonstrates examples of notable successes in outlining a rigorous
consultation process and the challenges to that process that arose when
implementing an Arctic development scheme.
i. Sámi Consultation in Norway
The ILO produced a document detailing the challenges and successes
Norway faced while pursuing the consultation process with the Sámi, a
population whose land Sápmi (ancestral territory) lies across national borders
of the four countries now called Finland, Norway, Russia, and Sweden.83
Norway became the first country to ratify Convention 169 in 1990.84 In
2003, Norway sought to implement the consultation procedures with the
Sámediggi (Sámi Parliament) via the highly contested Finnmark Act.85 Sámi
institutions and legal experts asserted the Finnmark Act did not meet
Convention 169’s standards, and a debate ensued over whether the Finnmark
Act’s process and substance sufficiently protected Sámi land, natural
resource rights, and the consultation requirement.86 With significant
79. See id. at 17–18.
80. See id. at 18–20.
81. See id. at 20.
82. See id. at 23.
83. See PROCEDURES FOR CONSULTATIONS WITH INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: EXPERIENCES
FROM NORWAY, INT’L LABOUR ORG. 9 (2016), https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/--dgreports/---gender/documents/publication/wcms_534668.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6LRTABC9].
84. See id. at 10.
85. See id. at 10–11.
86. Id. In a 2003 report, the Committee of Experts emphasized:
The process and the substance are inextricably intertwined in the requirements of
the Convention, and in the present conflict. It appears to the Committee that if the
Sámediggi, as the acknowledged representative of the Sami people of Norway, were
to agree to the proposal, they could accept this solution as a resolution of the claims
of land rights which have long been the subject of negotiation between the Sami and
the Government. The adoption of the Finnmark Estate without such agreement
amounts, however, to an expropriation of rights recognized in judicial decisions in
Norway and under the Convention.
Id. (quoting a 2003 CEACR Report).
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guidance and commentary from the CEACR, the Norwegian government
renewed its efforts to consult the Sámediggi and developed a dialogue
process that resulted in (1) the successful adoption of a revised and amended
Finnmark Act in 2005 and (2) the formation of a joint working group with
representatives of the Sámediggi and the Norwegian government pursuing
clarification of the legal standards for Norway’s duty to consult and
development of a proposal for mutually agreeable consultation procedures
and guidelines.87
The joint working group produced a report which identified Norway’s
various legal obligations to the Sámi under international law and found
Convention 169 to be Norway’s most explicit commitment to Indigenous
peoples’ rights.88 One key aspect to the strength of Convention 169 is that it
foregrounds the participation requirement for the Indigenous peoples
concerned, realized through the provisions establishing the state’s
responsibility to develop a collaborative relationship with the Sámi, such that
the Indigenous community has the opportunity to participate in the protection
of its rights in an active, systematic, and culturally responsive manner.89
Reflecting this ideal, the 2006 guidelines outlined a “dual approach” to
consultation and participation: Sámi participation in the legislative process
alone does not constitute consultation, and Sámi consultation does not
preclude participation in the legislative process for issues of significance to
them.90 The guidelines aimed to establish an ongoing communication pattern
by which the Sámi’s interests are considered from the outset of the legislative
process through participation, and, simultaneously, the Sámi are supported
in acting independently and making autonomous decisions through
exercising their traditional decision-making authorities through
consultation.91
Critically, the working group’s 2005 procedures also specify the
geographical and substantive scope of the duty to consult. The Norwegian
government’s obligation to consult the Sámediggi under Convention 169
covers seven counties that are traditional Sámi areas, all land dispositions,
land interventions, and land rights within traditional Sámi areas, and may
include all material and immaterial forms of Sámi culture.92
87. See id.
88. See id. at 13. The working group also identified legal frameworks and duties
underpinning the adoption of Convention 169, including the UN ICCPR (1966), which
Norway incorporated in its legislation through its 1999 Human Rights Act. See id.
89. See id. at 15.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 20 (quoting the 2005 procedures) (noting that material and immaterial forms
of Sámi culture include music, theatre, literature, art, media, language, religion, cultural
heritage, immaterial property rights and traditional knowledge, place names, health and social
welfare, day care facilities for children, education, research, land ownership rights and rights
to use lands, matters concerning land administration and competing land utilization, business
development, reindeer husbandry, fisheries, agriculture, mineral exploration and extraction
activities, wind power, hydroelectric power, sustainable development, preservation of cultural
heritage, biodiversity and nature conservation).
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The procedures also recognize the difficulty of determining precisely the
traditional borders of Sápmi and give special consideration to Sámi interests
in those areas, even where Sámi culture today is weak and its visibility has
been diminished by decades of erasure and assimilationist policies.93
After several years of biannual meetings between Sámediggi and
Norwegian state representatives, the ILO produced a report reflecting
optimism that a mutually agreeable consultation procedure can be
developed.94 The Sámediggi urged that the consultation process produced
positive experiences and outcomes that could serve as a model.95 Further,
after the Sámediggi identified and cited a number of specific inadequacies
that could be addressed—including inadequate scope in the administrative
and political leadership representing the state, inadequate information and
background material, and procedural backlog and deferral—Norwegian state
authorities took steps to conduct an internal evaluation of the processes and
both parties came to an agreement on heightened standards for meetings,
communications, and procedures throughout the consultation process.96
However, some issues remained highly contentious. The parties failed to
reach agreement on the 2009 Norwegian Minerals Act (the “Minerals Act”),
a plan to explore and exploit minerals owned by the state that directly
affected Sámi land and reindeer management.97 The Minerals Act provided
that an exploring party in Finnmark must “take reasonable steps to obtain
information about directly affected Sami interests in the area,” and that the
exploration permit application might be refused if it would be contrary to
Sámi interests, providing an opportunity to comment for the Sámediggi, local
authorities, and reindeer management boards, but leaving ultimate decisionmaking capacity to the Norwegian state authority.98
The Sámediggi expressed serious concern that the Minerals Act did not
provide adequate consultations on mineral exploration permits in Finnmark
and other traditional Sámi lands, and in response, developed its own draft
guide for mineral resource exploration and development that it adopted in
2010.99 The mineral guide was aimed at transparency and predictability,
intended to ensure that the Sámi could negotiate about exploratory activities
and operations, so that they would share in the benefits of the business
involving their land and continue their strong relationships with businesses
that benefit, strengthen, and develop Sámi culture to coexist with traditional
Sámi lifeways.100 The Sámediggi urged that its mineral guide was an attempt
to overcome a situation in which the Sámediggi could not provide consent to

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

See id.
Id.
Id. at 30.
See id.
See id. at 31–32.
See id.
See id. at 32.
See id. at 33–34.
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all mineral activities, recalling that the Sámediggi had refused the Minerals
Act and any activities regulated by it twice.101
Further, the Sámediggi reminded the Norwegian state government of the
real consequences of proceeding with legislation that ran counter to Sámi
interests and to which the Sámi had not given their consent: the Sámediggi
held powerful sway with the private companies engaged in the mineral
business, and, historically, these mineral companies would stay activity
whenever the Sámediggi refused their consent.102 Ultimately, the Sámediggi
called for the Minerals Act to be clarified and revised with respect to Sámi
rights, and, as predicted, they were joined in this call by the Norwegian
Mineral Industry, the trade association for the entire Norwegian mineral and
mining industry that represents approximately 160 member-companies and
works in cooperation with the Norwegian national industry association and
industry suppliers of goods and services.103
b. Consultation Applied in Arctic Shipping
If the United States ratifies Convention 169, it can take advantage of the
lessons and warnings from other nations when developing and implementing
its consultation procedures. The United States could follow the model
pursued by Norway and the Sámediggi, building its consultation procedures
with the Indigenous peoples of the Alaskan Arctic before developing its
shipping routes and infrastructure to support the industry. In terms of
representation, the United States could begin to reach out to groups like the
international ICC and the local Alaska Native Corporations, including village
and regional corporations, which would demonstrate their representation and
responsiveness to their constituents per Convention 169’s requirements.
Building the consultation process before the polar shipping industry fully
emerges would provide a proactive response to the concerns expressed by
Arctic Alaska Native people and establish ongoing dialogue about a growing
industry that directly affects these marine peoples’ land and lifeways. The
development of the consultation process also presents an expanded
opportunity for Arctic Alaska Native peoples to participate in shaping the
industry such that it comports with the goal of coexisting with—rather than
supplanting—the traditional livelihoods. This further aligns with the
principles of Indigenous self-determination outlined in the UNDRIP.
c. Remaining Open Questions Under C. 169
Convention 169’s encouragement for “cross-border cooperation” and an
inter-governmental cooperative approach to facilitate consultation inevitably
101. See id. at 32–33.
102. See id.
103. See, e.g., About Us, NORSK BERGINDUSTRI, https://www.norskbergindustri.no/aboutus---info-in-english/ [https://perma.cc/U84F-H3VG] (last visited Apr. 14, 2022); Land,
Resource Rights Key to Sami People’s Self-Determination, Says UN Expert, UN NEWS (Aug.
31, 2015), https://news.un.org/en/story/2015/08/507642-land-resource-rights-key-samipeoples-self-determination-says-un-expert [https://perma.cc/9P5D-BBR7].
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raises the appropriateness of supporting (and perhaps imposing) panIndigeneity or a unifying “Arctic identity” among circumpolar Arctic
Indigenous peoples.104 Groups like the ICC, a major international nongovernment organization representing around 180,000 Inuit of Alaska,
Canada, Greenland, and Chukotka (Russia), formed when Inuit sought to
speak with a united voice on issues of common concern and to strengthen
unity, promote rights, and encourage policies that would safeguard Inuit and
their Arctic environment.105 However, as not every Arctic Indigenous group
is represented by such an institution, this returns to the significant
unanswered question that Convention 169 presents about whether the ILO
structure sufficiently provides access for Indigenous participation and
representation.
Further, Convention 169 faces a significant obstacle to successful
implementation in many states where histories of state-sponsored and
colonial violence, exclusion, and mistrust of Indigenous communities
contribute to a climate of confrontation and lack of mutual trust.106 Finally,
Convention 169 leaves open the complex interaction with private sector
actors, which may struggle with standard-setting and balk at the risk of being
caught between the standards of a given non-ratifying nation and the
standards of an enforceable legally binding instrument.107
V. CONCLUSION
This Article urges U.S. ratification of ILO Convention 169, the Indigenous
and Tribal Peoples Convention, in light of the rapidly changing Arctic
landscape and the burgeoning industry emerging in the region. Convention
169 is an imperfect but meaningful tool with the capacity to strengthen
dialogue between Arctic Indigenous people and the key governments, worker
organizations, and employers represented in the ILO’s tripartite structure. As
104. See, e.g., STEFANSSON ARCTIC INST. & ARCTIC COUNCIL SUSTAINABLE DEV. WORKING
GROUP, supra note 18, at 131–33 (“There are reasons to wonder if an Arctic identity exists at
the individual level, and whether such an identity is similarly understood in all eight Arctic
Council countries. Still, sometimes a broader and more general definition of an Arctic
identity—stretching over nations and regions—is used[,] . . . draw[ing] on and stress[ing]
valued characteristics that include resourcefulness and hard work in using nature to secure
material wealth and prosperity, resilience and adaptability in thriving in a cold climate,
closeness with nature and the desire to explore it, and commitment to protecting the Arctic
and its natural beauty. Nevertheless, . . . a general Arctic identity is still weak, while regional,
local and Indigenous identities have developed.”)
105. See
About
ICC:
Our
Story,
INUIT CIRCUMPOLAR COUNCIL,
www.inuitcircumpolar.com/about-icc/ [https://perma.cc/22G7-KCMB] (last visited Apr. 14,
2022). ICC holds a General Assembly every four years at which delegates from across the
circumpolar region elect a new Chair and an executive council, develop policies, and adopt
resolutions that will guide the activities of the organization for the coming term. See id. The
General Assembly is the heart of the organization, providing an opportunity for sharing
information, discussing common concerns, debating issues, and strengthening the bonds
between all Inuit. See id. The group maintains and builds affiliation with organizations such
as the Inuit Circumpolar Youth Council and the International Elders Council, including
representatives from these organizations at the General Assembly. See id.
106. See Understanding C. 169 Handbook, supra note 42, at 17.
107. See id. at 25.
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the polar shipping industry develops in a changing climate, Convention 169’s
consultation process offers a strong avenue to protect the land, autonomy,
and lifeways of Arctic Indigenous people and establish a stronger position
for the United States, its workers, and its corporations as global players in
the Arctic.

